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WORKERS' COMPENSATION
EXCEPTION TO THE GOING AND COMING RULE:
SPECIAL HAZARD OR RISK
N LITTLEFIELD V. PILLSBURY CO.,' the Ohio Supreme Court specifically
adopted the "special hazard or risk" 2 exception to the "going and coming"
rule.' This exception extends workers' compensation coverage to claims for
injuries sustained in accidents occuring outside an employer's premises, before
or after work, if the injury occurs because of a hazard created by the
employment.'
In Littlefield, plaintiff-appellant, Ronald Littlefield was employed as a
grain operator for defendant-appellee, The Pillsbury Company, of Cincinnati,
Ohio. Pillsbury's employees were allowed two fifteen minute paid breaks
as well as an unpaid one half hour break for lunch. It was the "customary
and accepted practice" to tack an unused break period onto lunch time.' Unless
employees brought their own lunches, they had to leave the premises to obtain
lunch. Pillsbury occasionally paid for food and beverages at the closest available
luncheon facility for those "employees who worked extra hours, and on other
occasions at the discretion of Pillsbury.' '6
On the date of the accident, Littlefield was scheduled to work a twelve
hour day. He had in fact worked through his normal morning break as well
as his normal lunch period. At approximately 1:45 p.m., Littlefield and another
employee left the Pillsbury plant to obtain lunch at the closest available luncheon
facility, which was approximately one-eighth of a mile from the Pillsbury plant
on River Road in Cincinnati, Ohio.
Upon returning to the Pillsbury plant by the most direct route possible,
the car in which Littlefield was a passenger paused on River Road before turn-
ing left into the sole entrance to the plant. River Road is a four lane public
highway with heavy truck traffic. While waiting to turn left into the Pillsbury
entrance, the car was struck from the rear by a truck.
An injury, in order to be compensable in Ohio, must occur in the "course
'6 Ohio St. 3d 389, 453 N.E.2d 570 (1983).
'See generally, 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 15.13 (1983).
3See generally, id at §§ 15.00-15.54.
'6 Ohio St. at 393, 453 N.E.2d at 575.
'Id. at 389, 453 N.E.2d at 570.
'Id. at 389-90, 453 N.E.2d at 570.
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of, and arising out of the injured employee's employment.'" 7 The Ohio Supreme
Court has set forth the test for participation in the Workers' Compensation
Fund as "not whether there was any fault or neglect on the part of the employer
or the employees, but whether a 'causal connection' existed between an
employee's injury and his employment either through the activities, the condi-
tions or the environment of the employment." 8
To determine whether an injury has occurred in the "course of and aris-
ing out of employment," the Ohio Supreme Court has used the "going and
coming rule." This rule asserts that:
[wihere an employee, having a fixed and limited place of employment,
sustains an injury while traveling to and from his place of employment
such injury does not evidence the required causal connection to the employ-
ment; it therefdore does not arise out of and in the course of his employ-
ment and is not compensable. 9
To avoid strict application of this general rule, however, the majority of
jurisdictions have followed the "special hazard or risk" exception to compen-
sation. This exception states that when the normal route "which employees
must traverse to reach the plant" creates special hazards then "the special
hazards of that route become the hazards of employment."' 0
Although the Ohio Supreme Court had not specifically enunciated the
special hazards exception prior to Littlefield, it had allowed compensation for
injuries that occurred off the premises when there had been a causal connec-
tion between the injuries and the employment." This is, in effect, the special
hazard doctrine.
The most commonly used special hazard test consists of a two part analysis.
The first part determines whether or not there is a "zone of employment,"
or a close association between the access route and the employer's premises.
The second part forms a basis for causation between the special hazard and
the off-premises location."
'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(C)(Page Supp. 1983).
'Bralley v. Daugherty, 61 Ohio St. 2d 302, 303, 401 N.E.2d 448, 449 (1980); See also Fox v. Indus. Comm.,
162 Ohio St. 569, 573, 125 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1955). Indus. Comm. v. Gintert, 128 Ohio St. 129, 132, 190 N.E.
400, 402 (1934); Indus. Comm. v. Wiegandt, 102 Ohio St. 1,7, 130 N.E. 38, 39 (1921).
'Bralley v. Daugherty, 61 Ohio St. 2d at 303-304, 401 N.E.2d at 450 (1980); See also Lohnes v. Young,
175 Ohio St. 291, 194 N.E.2d 428, 430 (1963); Simerlink v. Young, 172 Ohio St. 427, 429, 178 N.E.2d
168, 169 (1961); Indus. Comm. v. Gintert, 128 Ohio St. 129, 132, 190 N.E. 400, 402 (1934); Indus. Comm.
v. Baker, 127 Ohio St. 345, 349, 188 N.E. 560, 562 (1933). See generally, 82 Am. Jur. 2d Workmen's
Compensation § 255 (1976).
"See generally, LARSON, supra note 2.
' See Bralley v. Daugherty, 61 Ohio St. 2d at 304,401 N.E.2d at 450 (1980); See also Marlow v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 10 Ohio St. 2d 18, 21, 225 N.E.2d 241, 244 (1967); Sebek v. Cleveland Graphite Bronz
Co., 148 Ohio St. 693, 698, 76 N.E.2d 892, 894-95 (1947); Gregory v. Indus. Comm., 129 Ohio St. 365,
369, 195 N.E. 699, 701 (1935); Kasari v. Indus. Comm., 125 Ohio St. 410, 413, 181 N.E. 809, 810 (1932).
'LARSON, supra note 2; YOUNG, WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW OF OHIO § 5.7 (2d Ed. 1971).
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When the injury occurs at a point off, but in close proximity to, the
employer's premises, that point may be considered to be within the "zone of
employment." This extends the environment of the employment beyond the
employer's premises. I3 The clearest case for compensability is found when the
off-premises route is the only means of access to the employer's premises.'
4
This is due to the fact that:
[E]mployment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a
reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to
and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be in-
jured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer,
to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those
of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a
part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in
the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while
the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. I
Thus, the use of the off-premises route bears a causal connection to the
employment. In determining whether or not hazards existing at the injury site
are attributable to the employment, the courts often consider whether the in-
jured employee was subjected to any greater hazard than was a member of
the general public.'
6
Although the Ohio Supreme Court applied the analysis contained in this
test, it specifically adopted a two-prong test first devised by the California
Supreme Court in 1976.' The special hazard rule will apply "(1) if 'but for'
the employment, the employee would not have been at the location where the
injury occurred; and, (2) if the 'risk is distinctive in nature or quantitatively
greater than risks common to the public." 8
The majority found, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Celebrezze
and joined by Justices Sweeney and J.P. Celebrezze, that the facts of this case
satisfy the two-prong test.' 9 The majority announced:
"YOUNG, supra note 12, § 5.8; see also Baughman v. Eaton Corp., 62 Ohio St. 2d 62, 63, 402 N.E.2d
1201, 1202 (per curium 1980); Kasari v. Indus. Comm., 125 Ohio St. 410, 412-13, 181 N.E. 809, 810 (1932);
Indus. Comm. v. Barber, 117 Ohio St. 373, 381, 159 N.E. 363, 365 (1927); Blair v. Daugherty, 60 Ohio
App. 2d 165, 168, 396 N.E.2d 238, 240 (1978); contra, Becton, Dickinson, & Co. v. Indus. Comm,. 54
Ohio App. 2d 186, 187, 376 N.E.2d 961, 962-64 (1977)(where the court found lack of control by the
employer).
"LARSON, supra note 2.
"Bountiful Buick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 158 (1928).
6YOUNG supra note 12, at § 5.13; LARSON, supra note 2.
"General Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 16 Cal. 3d 595, 600, 128 Cal. Rptr. 417, 419-20,
546 P.2d 1361, 1363-64 (1976); See also Parks v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 33 Cal. 3d 585, 590, 190
Cal. Rptr. 158, 161, 660 P.2d 383 (1983).
aParks, 33 Cal. 3d 585, 598, 190 Cal. Rptr. 158, 161, 660 P.2d 383, 385 (1983). As of this writing, no
state other than Ohio has adopted the California test.
"6 Ohio St. 3d at 395, 453 N.E.2d at 576.
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It is clear that 'but for' his employment, Littlefield would not have been
making a left turn into the plant .... [A]lthough the risk attendant to
the busy road was common to the general public using it, Littlefield's risk
was peculiar and to an abnormal degree. That is, his risk was 'quantitatively
greater' than that to which other motorists occasionally driving down the
road are subjected.2"
The court further found that "[t]he regular exposure to the common risk plus
the risk of making a left turn creates a greater degree of risk and sustains the
causal relationship between the employment and the accident resulting from
the risk.'' 2 '
Typically awards should not be made solely upon a showing that an in-
jury took place in an area that was the sole or usual route to the employer's
plant. Several cases have held, however, that the necessity of making a left
hand turn across traffic in a public street in order to enter the employer's
premises is a special hazard of the employment.2"
The majority also supported its finding by comparing facts of the Little-
field case with those of Industrial Commission v. Henry. 23 Justice C. Brown,
in his concurring opinion, emphasized that "[t]o deny compensation to Little-
field would be a retreat from Henry into some era of the Dark Ages of
jurisprudence, completely ignoring the rules pertaining to causal connection
between an employee's injury and his employment." 2
In Henry, the court permitted compensation to an employee injured while
crossing a railroad track immediately adjacent to the sole means of ingress and
egress to his employer's plant. In both cases, therefore, the accident occurred
immediately adjacent to the sole means of ingress and egress of the employer's
plant. In Henry, the employee left the employer's premises for breakfast at
a nearby restaurant after approximately an hour on the job. The accident oc-
curred as he returned to work. The employer acquiesced to the off-premises
breakfast practice because it contributed to the workers' efficency. The Ohio
Supreme Court thus concluded that it was a custom incidental to the
employment."2
In Littlefield, Pillsbury occassionally paid for food and beverages at the
closest available luncheon facility from which Littlefield was returning when
he was injured. On the day of the accident Littlefield had worked through his
normal paid morning break as well as his normal lunch period. Because Little-
field had worked many more hours before his break than the worker in Henry,
°Id. at 394, 453 N.E.2d at 575.
2Id.
22See LARSON, supra note 2.
2 124 Ohio St. 616, 180 N.E. 194 (1932).
"6 Ohio St. 3d at 395, 453 N.E.2d at 576.
"Indus. Comm. v. Henry, 124 Ohio St. 616, 621, 180 N.E. 194, 196 (1932).
[Vol. 17:4
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the break should have contributed more to Littlefield's productivity and should
similarly be considered incidental to the employment.26
Young's treatise on Ohio workers' compensation law recognizes a recent
trend in analysis, a "totality of the circumstances" concept, which is similar
to that used by the Ohio Supreme Court in Littlefield." Understandably con-
fused by the development of the special hazard concept in cases leading up
to Littlefield, the Ohio courts have simply considered all of the relevant cir-
cumstances in cases to reach "reasonable" and "rational" decisions. 28
Justice Locher, in a strong dissent to Littlefield, predicted that the "deci-
sion will ruin the Workers' Compensation Fund in Ohio . . . .In effect the
majority has legislated a universal super-insurance without actuarial basis via
the Workers' Compensation Fund." 29 Among the "[e]ndless ramifications"
certain to follow, according to Justice Locher, are claims against employers
based on damages done to third parties,3" injuries sustained inside employees'
homes,3" and the injuries of an employee who negligently makes a left-hand
turn from a public road anywhere along that employee's commute to or from
work or during his lunch hour."
Justice Locher examined the majority's analysis and found that the first
prong of the test, "but for" the employment, the employee would not have
been at the location where the injury occurred, does not establish a sufficient
criterion for a "causal connection" between the employment and the resul-
tant injury." He then distinguished the California cases from which the majority
adopted the two prong test.34 He stated that while there was a direct relation-
ship between the employment and the injury in the California cases, "[t]here
[was] no evidence that the oncoming traffic or the truck which injured Lit-
266 Ohio St. 3d at 395, 453 N.E.2d at 576.
"YOUNG supra note 12, at § 5.7 (Supp. 1982)
"See Lord v. Daugherty, 66 Ohio St. 2d 441, 423 N.E.2d 96 (1981); Baughman v. Eaton Corp., 62 Ohio
St. 62, 402 N.E.2d 1201 (1980); Bralley v. Daugherty, 61 Ohio St. 2d 302, 401 N.E.2d 448 (1980); Blair
v. Daugherty, 60 Ohio App. 2d 165, 14 Ohio Op. 3d 132, 396 N.E.2d 238 (1978).
2'6 Ohio St. 3d at 396, 453 N.E.2d at 577 (Locher, J., dissenting).
301d.
"Id. at 397, 453 N.E. 2d at 577.
[E]mployees who bathe at home before leaving for work each morning because they are expected
to "look good on the job" will have viable workers' compensation claims should they slip in the
bathtub. Their employment creates the "distinctive" risk of good hygiene, and recovery - under
the majority view - naturally follows. Id.
"d.
"Id. at 397-398, 453 N.E.2d at 578, Justice Locher argues that "the 'but for' rule in tort law is only used
to exclude negligent defendants from liability rather than establish a basis for liability." See W. PRO-
SSER, LAW OF TORTS (4th Ed. 1971) 238-239, Section 41; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 432(1); See
also McNees v. Concinnati Street Ry. Co., 152 Ohio St. 269, 89 N.E.2d 138 (1949), requiring a "prox-
imate causal relationship between the employment and the injury."
"Parks, 33 Cal. 3d 585, 190 Cal. Rptr. 158, 660 P.2d 382; General Ins. Co. 16 Cal. 3d 595, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 417, 546 P.2d 1361.
Spring, 1984]
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tlefield had any relationship to Pillsbury's business." 35
Justice Locher distinguished four Ohio cases on the basis that they allowed
recovery where the employee was on the employer's premises36 or on property
owned, maintained and controlled by the employer."' Littlefield, by contrast,
was off the premises when he was injured. 8 In another Ohio case,39 recovery
was allowed where an employee was required to cross a public street in order
to report for work. Justice Locher argued that Littlefield was not required to
leave the premises for lunch, but could have brought his lunch and used the
facility provided by Pillsbury. 0
Finally, Justice Locher distinguished Henry on the basis that the employee
in Henry was on duty and in the service of the company performing his work
when he was injured. It was a custom for the men to go to get their breakfast
while waiting for their orders to be filled. The employer acquiesced to this prac-
tice. Thus, "it was a custom incidental to the employment, and the employer
contemplated that Henry should act according to the custom."' Justice Locher
found that although fifteen minutes of the time Littlefield took for lunch was
paid break time and even though other similarities existed between the facts
in Littlefield and those found in the cases explored by the majority, this did
not establish as a matter of fact that Littlefield was "on duty" and "in the
service of the company performing" his work when he was injured. 2 Therefore,
Justice Locher concluded, Henry was not controlling. 3
Justice Holmes also wrote a dissenting opinion to Littlefield in which he
emphasized that Littlefield was not on premises controlled by the employer
nor was he performing services for Pillsbury. The choice of going out for lunch
and using the road in question, moreover, "[was] not a risk incident to his
employment (if it is a risk at all).""' Justice Holmes further asserted:
The majority of this court has literally blown away a plethora of Ohio
case law which has continuously held that the right of an employee to
participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund is based upon whether
"6 Ohio St. 3d at 398, 453 N.E.2d at 579. Justice Locher also questions the majority's reliance on California
authority: "We should recognize that California permits employees to recover for injuries occuring within.
. a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where
the work is to be done," Id. (Citing Parks, 33 Cal. 3d at 590, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 161, 660 P.2d at 385.
3 Gregory v. Indus. Comm., 129 Ohio St. 365, 195 N.E. 699 (1935); Kasari v. Indus. Comm., 125 Ohio
St. 410, 181 N.E. 809 (1932).
"Marlow v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 10 Ohio St. 2d 18, 225 N.E.2d 241 (1967); Indus. Comm.
v. Barber, 117 Ohio St. 373, 159 N.E. 363 (1927).
3S6 Ohio St. 3d at 400, 453 N.E.2d at 580.
"Baughman v. Eaton Corp., 62 Ohio St. 2d 62, 402 N.E.2d 1201 (1980).
1O6 OHIO ST. 3d at 402, 453 N.E.2d at 581.
'Henry, 124 Ohio St. at 620-21, 180 N.E. at 196.
'16 Ohio St. 3d at 403, 453 N.E.2d at 582.
"4Id.
"Id. at 404, 453 N.E.2d at 583.
[Vol. 17:4
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or not there is a real causal connection between the employee's injury and
his employment .... The only concluding comment that I can make is
- what next! 5
To the extent that the Ohio courts have allowed compensation for injuries
occuring off the employer's premises when there was a causal connection
between the injuries and the employment,"' Ohio had already implicitly
recognized a special hazard concept. '7 The adoption of the special hazard rule
is consistent then with the test the Ohio courts have used in the past to deter-
mine the right to workers' compensation. This test is whether a causal connec-
tion exists between an employee's injury and the activities, conditions or environ-
ment of the employment.4 8 Thus, while not actually changing the law, Littlefield
articulates a more sharply focused test by adopting the two-prong test originally
devised by the California Supreme Court. 9
KAREN M. HOLMES
"Id. at 404-5, 453 N.E.2d at 583.
"4See supra, note 11 and accompanying text.
"LARSON, supra note 2 at n.23.
"See supra, note 5; see also YOUNG, supra note 12, at § 5.13.
"See supra, notes 17 through 21 and accompanying text.
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